The Tariff File
What the rates actually are
Two numbers get quoted for the U.S. level and they measure different things. The statutory stack — the orders on the books — puts the overall U.S. duty level on Chinese goods near 47% after Busan (down from 57%). The average effective rate, weighted by what is actually traded and net of exclusions, is 35.2% according to the Peterson Institute’s tracker (August 22, 2026). Both are correct. Neither is simple.
US avg effective tariff on China
35.2%
covering 89% of goods · PIIE, August 22, 2026
China avg effective tariff on US
31.9%
covering 100% of goods · PIIE, August 22, 2026
Change since Jan 20, 2025
+14.4 pp
US tariffs on China; China's rose +10.7 pp
Truce expiry
Jan 10, 2027
extended Sept 26, 2026 from Nov 10, 2026
The era stack
| Era | When | US on China | China on US |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-war baseline | January 2018 | ~3.1% | ~8.0% |
| Section 301 era | 2019–2024 | 7.5–25% statutory | 7.5–25% targeted |
| Escalation peak | April 2025 | 145% additional | 125% additional |
| Geneva truce | May 12, 2025 | 30% additional | 10% additional |
| Busan level | November 2025 | ~47% overall | suspensions |
| Current | October 2026 | 35.2% avg | 31.9% avg |
Pre-war baseline: Average effective rates before the first Section 301 tariffs (PIIE).
Section 301 era: Statutory 301 rates by list; exclusions and truces pulled effective averages down to ~19-21% by 2021.
Escalation peak: Statutory additional duties on most goods after the reciprocal-tariff rounds; electronics largely exempted April 11.
Geneva truce: 90-day de-escalation; later extended, then superseded by Busan.
Busan level: Fentanyl tariff halved; overall U.S. duty level on Chinese goods cut from 57% to about 47%; China suspends rare-earth controls.
Current: Average effective rates (PIIE, Aug 22, 2026): U.S. 35.2% covering 89% of goods; China 31.9% covering 100%. Truce runs to Jan 10, 2027.
Anatomy of the U.S. stack (October 2026)
- MFN baseline — the normal-trade-relations column, roughly 3% average, mostly unchanged since before the war. term →
- Section 301 — 7.5–25% by list, on roughly two-thirds of imports, minus exclusions; the 2024 review added 100% (EVs) and 50% (semiconductors) on strategic classes. term →
- IEEPA fentanyl — 10% after Busan (was 20%); the newest, most political layer. term →
- Reciprocal — mostly suspended since Geneva (May 2025); the September 2026 cuts lower covered additional duties to 30% (US) and 10% (China). term →
- Section 232 — steel, aluminum and derivatives; global measures that predate and parallel the China file. term →
Sources: PIIE tariff chart (piie.com); USTR Section 301 actions; Federal Register executive orders; Busan/September 2026 extension as reported by WSJ, Reuters, Time, Sept 26–29, 2026. This page is descriptive, not advisory — see the calculator for illustrative estimates and its caveats.
Asked constantly
What is the current US tariff on Chinese goods?
About 47% overall on the statutory stack after the Busan agreement (from 57% before it), while the average effective rate on traded goods is 35.2% (PIIE, August 22, 2026) — covering 89% of goods. The two numbers differ because exclusions, exempt categories and trade weighting pull the average down.
What does China charge on American goods?
An average effective 31.9% covering 100% of U.S. goods (PIIE, August 22, 2026), built from Section 301-style retaliation, the 2025 counter-tariffs on agriculture and energy, and truce reductions.
When does the truce end?
January 10, 2027. The Busan truce initially ran to November 10, 2026; the September 26, 2026 leaders' meeting extended it and added $60 billion of reciprocal tariff cuts on covered goods.
Are tariffs still at 145%?
No. That was the April 2025 peak of additional duties. Geneva (May 2025) cut the U.S. additional level to 30%; Busan (November 2025) brought the overall level to about 47%; September 2026 cuts lower covered additional duties further.
Did the tariffs cut the trade deficit?
The bilateral goods deficit fell from $418B (2018 peak) to $202.7B (2025). But the overall U.S. trade deficit with the world grew over the same period — imports re-routed through Vietnam, Mexico and elsewhere, often with Chinese content inside.